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there were enormous changes in many of the tax and transfer programs that affect single mothers. These changes dramatically increased the incentive to work. Between 1984 and 1996, real dollars received through the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which go primarily to working families with children, increased more than ten-fold. Likewise, between 1984 and 1996 the number of children receiving Medicaid increased 72 percent, while the number of covered adults with dependent children increased 27 percent. These Medicaid expansions primarily affected non-welfare families with incomes near the poverty line, making work more attractive for low-income single mothers. Since 1993, nearly every state has experimented with changes in its welfare programs, often under waivers of the existing program rules. Many of these changes imposed work requirements, time limits, or other measures that encouraged single mothers to work. Finally, there were increases in child care funding for single mothers. These program changes combined to greatly increase the incentive for single mothers to enter the workforce.
At the same time, there was a substantial increase in the employment of single mothers. The annual employment of all single mothers increased by about 9 percentage points between 1984 and 1996, while that for single mothers with children under six increased 13.5 percentage points. Nearly all of this increase occurred after 1991. We should emphasize that all of these changes took place before the "elimination of welfare as we knew it" under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) which replaced AFDC with TANF. This paper has two objectives. The first is to describe in detail the major tax and welfare policy changes affecting the employment of single mothers during the 1984 to 1996 period leading up to PRWORA. Many papers have described one element of the these changes, but no past work has described in detail the larger pattern of policy change. We describe the federal EITC, state EITCs, and other federal and state tax changes. We describe the effects of changes in many aspects of AFDC, Food Stamps, and Medicaid including: changes in AFDC benefits levels, earnings disregards and benefit reduction rates; the expansions of Medicaid coverage to low-income non-AFDC children; and the recent flurry of welfare waivers. We also discuss the effects of changes in child care and training programs during this period. Because PRWORA changed many features of welfare in ways that are difficult to characterize, we end our analysis in 1996.
The second objective of the paper is to examine whether the changes in employment rates over time for different demographic groups and states are consistent with a causal effect of these policies on employment. These comparisons provide a transparent way of examining the plausibility of the findings of Meyer and Rosenbaum (forthcoming) .
1 Using a simple structural approach, Meyer and Rosenbaum estimated that about 60 percent of the increase in single mothers' employment between 1984 and 1996 was due to the EITC expansions. Smaller, but substantial, roles were found for welfare benefit cuts and welfare waivers, while child care played an even smaller role. Though more structural approaches have advantages, 2 transparency is not one of them. With many influences interacting to produce the variables, combined with functional form assumptions, it is often hard to see what leads to structural coefficient estimates. This paper provides simple comparisons that examine whether it is plausible that the EITC was the main source of the employment changes, and examines the plausibility of alternative hypotheses. Combined with the evidence in Meyer and Rosenbaum (forthcoming) and other papers, we can provide a convincing picture.
POLICY CHANGES THAT AFFECTED LABOR SUPPLY
In this section, we describe the major policy changes between 1984 and 1996 that affected the labor supply of single mothers. 3 For each policy or program, we first provide some brief background information and outline the major changes between 1984 and 1996 (see Figure 1 for a time line depicting these changes). Next, we describe how and when the policies affected different groups. Finally, we analyze the theoretical effects of these changes on the choice of whether or not to work.
The summary measures that we use to describe the policy changes capture their overall effects on the budget sets of single 1 Related work in Bishop (1998) and Ellwood (2000) examines the effects of the EITC on employment and other outcomes. Eissa and Liebman (1996) examine the EITC changes that were part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 2 Advantages of structural approaches include implications regarding what variables should influence outcomes and the form in which they do so, as well as improved validity for simulations. 3 We do not try to examine every government program that affects single women and their families. Other relevant programs we omit include training programs (see Meyer and Rosenbaum, 1999b) , public and subsidized housing, child support enforcement, food and nutrition programs other than Food Stamps, and Supplemental Security Income. women. We calculate the taxes and welfare benefits of single women at 30 different earnings levels and then average these values to get an overall effect for each policy that we examine.
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The EITC and Federal and State Income Taxes
In recent years, the most important change for single mothers in the financial incentive to work has probably come from the Earned Income Tax Credit.
5 EITC credits increased fifteen-fold from $1.6 billion in 1984 to a projected $25.1 billion in 1996. Single parents received over two-thirds of these EITC dollars (U.S. House of Representatives, Green Book, 1996 ; U.S. Department of the Treasury, SOI, 1999) . 6 In 1996, a single woman with two children who earned less than $8,890 (the phasein range) received a 40 percent credit on dollars earned, up to a maximum of $3,556. Because the credit is refundable and a mother of two with those earnings was not subject to any federal income tax (due to the standard deduction and personal exemptions), she would have received a check from the IRS for the credit amount. With additional earnings up to $11,610 the credit amount did not change. Additional earnings beyond $11,610 and up to $28,495 (the phase-out range) resulted in a reduction in the credit by 21.06 percent of the additional earnings, until the credit was reduced to zero at earnings of $28,495. This credit schedule meant that a woman with two children earning between $5,000 and just under $19,000 received at least a $2,000 credit.
The current EITC is the result of several legislative changes (summarized in Figure 1 ) which greatly epanded the EITC after 1984. Between its beginning in 1975 and the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) the EITC was small and the credit amounts did not keep up with inflation. Beginning with the TRA86, the EITC was expanded in a number of dimensions.
First, credit rates, phase-in ranges and phase-out ranges were increased considerably. For example, for a mother of one child in 1984, the credit rate was 10 percent for earnings up to the end of the phase-in range at $5,000, implying a maximum credit of $500. In 1987 the credit rate rose to 14 percent on earnings up to $5,080, implying a maximum credit of $851. In 1988 the beginning and end of the phaseout range were increased by about $3,000. The credit parameters were then unchanged in real terms for several years, but beginning in 1991 the credit rates rose in small steps, up to 18.5 percent in 1993. In 1994 and 1995 there were large increases in the credit rates, to 26.3 and 34.0 percent respectively, though the phase-in range was reduced. The resulting maximum credit for a mother of one child was $2,094 in 1995.
Second, in 1991 the credit was expanded to provide a larger credit for families with two or more children, and families with very young children. The increment to the maximum credit for a second child was small through 1993, never exceeding $77. Beginning in 1994, however, the difference began to rise sharply; it rose to $490 in , $1,016 in 1995 , and $1,404 in 1996 . From 1991 through 1993 , there were also 4 The assumptions and data used in these calculations are described in Meyer and Rosenbaum (forthcoming) .
See Table 1 for the average values of the policy variables at various earnings levels. Note that for single mothers we compute policy variables for each year using the sample of single mothers from the entire 1984-96 sample. This approach accounts for changes in policies, but holds constant over time each state's distribution of family sizes and child ages. 5 See Liebman (1998) for a history of the EITC and a survey of many of the key economic issues. 6 Most of the remaining dollars are received by married taxpayers. Third, prior to 1991 children generally had to be claimed as dependents in order to be qualifying children, which required that the taxpayer provide more than half of their support. This requirement meant that low-income mothers who received more in AFDC than in earnings would not qualify for the EITC. Since 1991, to qualify the taxpayer must have a child under 19 or a full-time student under 24 who lived with the taxpayer for more than half of the year, regardless of who supported them. 8 Fourth, the relationship of the EITC with other programs has changed over time. Prior to October 1984, the EITC was counted as earned income in AFDC and Food Stamp calculations at the time it was earned. Between October 1984 and October 1989, it was counted at the time it was received, thereby typically affecting AFDC and Food Stamp benefits only when the tax return check was received. Between October 1989 and January 1991, the EITC was not counted as income in AFDC calculations (except for the gross income test), and effective January 1991, the EITC was not counted at all in most means-tested programs including AFDC, Food Stamps, and Medicaid. 9 By not counting the EITC in these means-tested programs, these reforms have increased its value for very low-income women.
We should note that there were other changes in federal income taxes during this period that affected single women. In particular, in 1987 the personal exemption was increased by $820 and in 1988 the standard deduction for household heads rose by $1,860. These changes, in conjunction with the many changes in EITC credit rates, and phase-in and phase-out ranges, make it hard to picture the changes in taxes at various earnings levels. To aid this evaluation, we plot in Figure 2 the difference in after-tax earnings (earnings minus federal income taxes plus the EITC) between a woman with two children and a woman with no children for various pre-tax earnings levels in 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996. 10 We focus on the difference between a woman with two children and a childless woman because this comparison is used in our analysis of employment trends below.
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Figure 2 illustrates several important aspects of the EITC expansions. First, between 1984 and 1988, single mothers of two with earnings between $10,000 and $20,000 experienced increases in take home pay (relative to single women without children) that ranged from $500 to $1,500.
12 Thus, the reward to working increased substantially for single mothers relative to single childless women. Most of this increase was due to large increases in both the maximum credit and the earnings level before the credit phase-out began. Between 1988 and 1990, tax and EITC parameters were adjusted only for inflation, so the after-tax earnings difference remained the same. Between 1990 and 1992, the moderate increase in the credit rate is evident. 7 In 1993 (the last year of these credits), total credit received for child health insurance premiums were 0.46 billion dollars and for children under one were 0.76 billion dollars, while the value of the basic credit was 14.3 billion dollars (U.S. Department of the Treasury, SOI, 1994). 8 Beginning in 1994, childless taxpayers could receive a small credit. 9 Beginning in 1997, some states chose to count the EITC in benefit calculations for their welfare programs. 10 Note that Figure 2 only illustrates differences in after-tax earnings due to federal income taxes and the EITC.
Other programs and work expenses, especially child care expenses, would need to be taken into account to fully characterize differences in disposable income between single women with and without children. 11 Changes over time in this difference were almost entirely due to changes in taxes paid (or credits received) by single mothers, as can be seen in Table 1 . 12 Unless noted, all dollar amounts are in 1996 dollars, indexed by the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) deflator.
The most striking feature of Figure 2 is the effect of the 1994-6 expansions, which particularly affected women with two or more children. 13 For example, the take home pay difference for women with $7,500 of earnings increased only about $600 between 1984 and 1993, but increased over $1,500 between 1993 and 1996. Unlike the earlier expansions, those since 1993 dramatically increased the take home pay difference for very low-income women (earnings under $10,000) due to large increases in the credit rate and maximum credit. Thus, these EITC expansions sharply increased over a short period of time the reward for working, particularly for women with two or more children.
As well as federal income tax changes, there were changes in state income taxes, including state EITCs. By 1994, seven states had their own EITCs. The largest five of these states with credits introduced them during the period we examine. All of the state EITCs were set as a fraction of the federal EITC and thus increased when it did.
14 Four states had refundable tax credits (Minnesota, New York, Wisconsin, and Vermont), while three other states had non-refundable credits (Iowa, Maryland, and Rhode Island). The size of these credits range from Iowa's nonrefundable credit set at 6.5 percent of the federal EITC (a maximum of $231 in 1996) to Wisconsin's refundable credit, which in 1996 was set at 43 percent of the federal EITC for families with three or more children (a maximum of $1,529). There were other state income tax changes during our sample period that reduced taxes for single mothers. More than a dozen states increased their personal exemption, increased their child credit, added a higher standard deduction or added a separate tax schedule for household heads. Quantitatively, though, these changes were not nearly as important as the institution and expansion of state EITCs.
To summarize these changes in federal and states taxes, we calculate the average taxes a single mother would pay if she Children: 1984 Children: , 1988 Children: , 1992 Children: , 1996 13 Figure 2 does not incorporate the small credit, instituted beginning in 1994, available to taxpayers without qualifying children who were 25 and older. This credit is incorporated in the tax variable used in the empirical work below. 14 Wisconsin used a slightly different rule, but only in 1994.
worked, which we call Income Taxes if Work. We obtain this measure by averaging taxes over the earnings distribution for single women. We use separate earnings distributions for women with and without children from the March CPS, which we average over all years 1984-96. We use this earnings distribution to calculate several other variables below. To illustrate the changes in the Income Taxes if Work variable over time, in Figure 3 we plot its mean for single women with zero, one, and two or more children by year from 1984-96. Figure 3 and The theoretical effect of the EITC expansions on the annual labor force participation decision of single parents is unambiguously positive. Since the EITC expansions have increased the after-tax return to work at all earnings levels, some work during the year is unambiguously more attractive for single mothers. The effect of the EITC and its expansions on the hours of work among those working is much less clear and depends on where a person would choose to work on the pre-and post-credit budget sets. The higher income that one receives under the credit will discourage work through the income effect. While additional hours or weeks of work are encouraged as the credit is phased in, the phase-out of the credit adds an implicit tax which discourages additional work through the substitution effect. Overall, since more people are expected to be on the phase-out range than the phase-in range, this negative substitution effect combined with the income effect is likely to reduce the hours and weeks worked of those who do work. One might wonder if these income tax incentives for low-income households were ineffective because households were unaware of the incentives or did not bother to file tax returns (for evidence on knowledge of the EITC see Romich and Weisner, 2000, and Smeeding et. al., 2000) . However, EITC takeup appears to be high and rising. Scholz (1990 Scholz ( , 1994 estimates that 75 percent of EITC eligibles in 1988 and between 80 and 86 percent of EITC eligibles in 1990 received the credit. 15 One of the reasons for this high takeup rate is the common use of paid tax preparers by low-income women (Olson and Davis, 1994) . With the increases in the EITC after 1990, one might expect that the participation rate rose further, though tougher compliance efforts may have discouraged some filers.
AFDC and Food Stamps
The two programs most commonly thought of as welfare are Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Food Stamps. 16 We discuss Food Stamps along with AFDC because nearly 90 percent of AFDC recipients also receive Food Stamps (U.S. House of Representatives, Green Book, 1996) . Both of these programs are large relative to other means-tested programs, but neither has grown much since 1984. Real spending on AFDC benefits fell slightly from $21.7 billion to $20.4 billion between 1984 and 1996, even though the number of recipients increased by 15 percent from 10.9 million to 12.6 million. Food Stamp program expenditures increased by over 35 percent during this same period from $20.0 billion to $27.3 billion, though most of this increase was due to the number of recipients rising from 20.9 million to 25.5 million. Even if some measures of overall spending did not change a great deal, there have been changes in the benefits and implicit tax rates under these programs over time, and in recent years there has been experimentation with many other features of these programs. Before describing these recent changes, it is useful to summarize how the programs work.
The AFDC program provides cash payments to families with children who have been deprived of support due to the absence or unemployment of a parent. The Food Stamp program provides lowincome households with coupons to purchase food. AFDC program parameters are set by the states, while most Food Stamp parameters are the same in all states. Nevertheless, because of the interaction of the eligibility and benefit calculations of the two programs, there are inter-state differences in the Food Stamps received for people in similar situations.
Eligibility and benefit calculations under the two programs follow roughly similar rules. A monthly benefit or guarantee that varies with family size is provided to recipients with no income. After an initial earnings exemption (earnings which result in no benefit reduction), benefits are reduced by the amount of the additional income times a fraction, called the implicit tax rate, until benefits are zero and the family is no longer eligible for the program. The full details of the calculations are quite involved.
There are several things that one should note about the calculations. First, there are complicated interactions between the two programs, because the Food Stamp program counts AFDC benefits as income in its benefit calculations (but the AFDC program does not count Food Stamp amounts as income in its benefit calculations). This rule implies that in states with sufficiently high AFDC benefits there is an implicit Food Stamp tax rate applied to the first dollar of earnings, while in other states initial earnings result in no benefit reduction. This rule also implies that for some states the Food Stamp implicit tax rate will fall when earnings are sufficiently high that AFDC benefits have been reduced to zero. Second, state AFDC programs differ in their earnings exemptions and implicit tax rates, though this point is not widely understood.
17 For example, since October 1989, in most states the earnings exemption for AFDC has been $120 during the first four months of work, $120 again during months five through eight, and $90 thereafter, but in Mississippi the earnings exemptions have been $372, $288, and $258, respectively. Furthermore, in most states the AFDC implicit tax rate is 0.67 during the first four months of work and 1.00 thereafter, but 0.40 and 0.60, respectively, in Mississippi. Third, the implicit tax rates can be substantial. Once AFDC and Food Stamp disregards are exhausted, a typical implicit tax rate is 0.71.
To illustrate these calculations, Figure  4 presents the 1996 benefit schedules for AFDC, Food Stamps, and Medicaid for women with two children in Alabama, Mississippi, and Pennsylvania. These states have been chosen to highlight the difficulty with the common approach of measuring the combined effect of AFDC and Food Stamps using only the combined maximum benefit. 18 Measuring the AFDC and Food Stamp programs using the combined maximum benefit ignores these interstate differences in earnings exemptions and implicit tax rates, which are likely to be important for working AFDC recipients or those considering work. For example, in 1996 a woman with two children who works part-time (80 hours per month) at a low wage ($5 per hour) receives $355 per month in combined AFDC and Food Stamp benefits in Mississippi, but only $295 in Food Stamps only in Alabama, even though the maximum benefit is higher in Alabama ($468) than in Mississippi ($424).
19 Consequently, summarizing these benefit schedules using only the maximum combined benefit completely ignores this large source of variation in state AFDC benefit schedules. Figure 5 shows the time pattern of the mean maximum welfare benefit and the mean benefit if a single mother works (averaging over the earnings distribution described earlier). Due to cuts in AFDC, the mean maximum combined AFDC and Food Stamp benefit fell about 7 percent over the sample period. Over the same period mean benefits for a working single mother remained roughly constant as implicit tax rates were reduced.
Theory predicts that the AFDC and Food Stamp programs decrease labor supply for two reasons. First, the income effect of the guarantee amount (the maximum benefit) should make participation less likely and reduce hours worked if a woman participates. A cut in the maximum benefit unambiguously increases the likelihood of working. Second, the implicit tax rate resulting from the reduction in benefits as earnings increase, i.e., the substitution effect, reduces the return to work. However, for someone working, the effect of reducing the implicit tax rate on additional work is ambiguous since a reduction in the implicit tax rate means that the welfare benefits received when working are higher, which can lead people who were not receiving welfare to reduce their hours in order to do so. In summary, it is expected that cuts in the maximum benefit and reductions in the implicit tax rate on earnings while on AFDC will increase the likelihood of a woman working, though the effect of tax rate cuts on hours is uncertain.
Medicaid
Medicaid is the biggest and most costly program that aids single mothers and their children. Medicaid expenditures for those not aged or disabled (those remaining are predominately single mothers and their children) totaled $29.8 billion in 1996, and went to 24.1 million people (U.S. House of Representatives, Green Book, 1996, pp. 897-902 and http://www.hcfa.gov). Unlike the Food Stamp program and especially AFDC, Medicaid eligibility has expanded dramatically since 1984, resulting in a more than three-fold increase in Medicaid expenditures (and a 60 percent increase in the caseload) on families with dependent children between 1984 and 1994.
Prior to 1987, Medicaid eligibility for single mothers and their children required receipt of AFDC, except in the special cases of families with very large medical expenses, those receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and those leaving AFDC and receiving transitional Medicaid. In a series of expansions, Medicaid coverage was extended to low-income pregnant women and children (again see Figure 1 ). Beginning in April 1987, states were permitted to extend Medicaid coverage to children under age two in families with incomes below 100 percent of the Federal poverty line. 20 Subsequently, These rules describe what can be done with Medicaid dollars that are matched by the Federal government. Some states expanded medical coverage for children and sometimes adults with their own funds. Furthermore, the differences across states in the extent to which they took advantage of the permitted coverage options generated large differences in who was covered in different years in different states. Moreover, state AFDC rules interacted with the Medicaid expansions to determine the additional families covered. For example, in Alabama in 1996 (see Figure 4 ) a family consisting of a woman with two children was eligible for both AFDC and Medicaid provided that the woman's earnings per month were below $366. Her children born after September 1983 were eligible for Medicaid if the family's monthly income was below 100 percent of the Federal poverty line (about $1,050). Children under age six were covered if the family's monthly income was below 133 percent of the Federal poverty line (about $1,400). In a state like Pennsylvania (see Figure 4) , the effect of the Medicaid expansions was less dramatic, since families with monthly earnings below $752 were already eligible for Medicaid due to AFDC receipt. Thus, in states with higher AFDC payment standards, the Medicaid expansions affected a smaller fraction of children.
Medicaid also was extended under transitional Medicaid programs to families who left AFDC. Beginning in October 1984, families who lost AFDC due to the loss of the four-month earnings disregard were granted nine months of Medicaid coverage. Later, as part of the Family Support Act of 1988, states were required to extend Medicaid coverage (and provide child care) for twelve months to families who lost AFDC due to increased earnings. During the second six months states had the option to charge fees for child care or to charge premiums or limit available services for Medicaid.
One can summarize the Medicaid expansions by calculating the number of total family members that would be covered if a woman works. Figure 6 shows that Medicaid coverage for working single mothers increased on average by 0.26 family members between 1984 and 1996. The theoretical effect of Medicaid expansions on the decision to work is unambiguously positive, since those newly covered are those with earnings that would make them ineligible for AFDC. This conclusion should be qualified slightly given the low takeup rate of Medicaid under many expansions and the potential for the expansions to cause employers to drop health insurance coverage for their workers or make it less generous.
AFDC Program Waivers
The Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) was authorized to waive specified AFDC program requirements to allow states to experiment with program changes that were judged to promote the objectives of the program. This waiver authority had been rarely used prior to the late 1980s, but its use accelerated during the Bush administration and continued under President Clinton. Between January 1993 and August 1996, HHS approved welfare waivers in 43 states.
While states experimented with changes in nearly every aspect of AFDC, many provisions applied to small parts of states or would not be expected to have a substantial effect on the employment of single mothers. We focus on a few types of waiver provisions that were tried in many states. These provisions strengthened work and training requirements (27 states), set time limits for welfare receipt (24 states), or extended transitional child care or Medicaid benefits for those who leave AFDC (16 states). Some common types of provisions, such as expanded income disregards, have been incorporated in our summary of the AFDC program. Others, such as family caps (which limit the benefits for additional children) or increased resource limits (which loosened the asset restrictions for AFDC eligibility), likely had small or ambiguous effects on employment.
Unlike several other recent studies, we focus on implementation dates of waiver provisions and actual beginning dates of terminations. For illustrative purposes, we also report whether a state had made a major state-wide waiver application in case this indicates a tightening of administrative requirements in a state. In Figure 7 we report the fraction of single women living in states that had applied for or implemented various types of waivers. One can see that very few women were in states that had implemented significant waivers through at least 1994. The fraction of women in states that had made a major waiver application, however, was much higher, 0.22 in 1992 and 0.85 in 1996.
Child Care
The cost and quality of child care is likely to have an important effect on whether a mother works. A large number of federal and state programs affect the availability and cost of child care.
21 Several federal programs, such as the Dependent Care Tax Credit and Title XX Social Services Block Grants, have existed for decades, though have declined in importance in recent years. Another program, Head Start, has not declined in expenditures or enrollment, but is usually part day and serves 3 and 4 year-olds almost exclusively. The federal role in child care for lowincome women expanded greatly following the Family Support Act of 1988 and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. Four large programs started during this period: AFDC Child Care, Transitional Child Care, At-Risk Child Care, and Child Care and Development Block Grants. We focus on these programs because they were likely to be particularly important for single mothers. AFDC Child Care was provided to AFDC recipients who were employed or in training. Former recipients were eligible for Transitional Child Care for the first 12 months following termination of benefits. At-Risk Child Care was for low-income families not on AFDC who needed child care to work and were at risk of becoming eligible for AFDC. The Child Care and Development Block Grants program provided funds for child care services for low-income families, as well as for activities to improve the overall quality and supply of child care for all families. Total expenditures on these four federal programs by state and year are scaled by the number of single women in a state with children under six. These numbers can be seen in Figure 6 , which shows a steep rise in child care expenditures between 1989 and 1992, followed by a slower rise in later years. By 1992, federal expenditures under the four programs averaged over $250 per single mother with young children. Tables 1 and 2 provide summary measures of the changes over the 1984-96 period in the incentives for single mothers to work. Table 1 reports taxes, welfare and Medicaid benefits at different earnings levels as well as some summary measures of waivers and child care. Table 2 provides summary measures of changes in work incentives by combining the changes in taxes and benefits and averaging them over the earnings distributions of single women. Note that these earnings distributions do not vary over time, implying that changes over time reflect policy changes rather than changes in the wages or hours worked of single women. Annual tax payments by working single mothers fell by $1,442, while those for single women without children rose $187-a decrease of $1,629 in the taxes of single mothers relative to single women without children. The sharpest decreases in taxes were for single mothers with two or more children, whose taxes fell $868 more than single mothers with only one child.
Summarizing the Changes in Work Incentives
Over the same time period, the welfare benefits (AFDC and Food Stamps) for working single mothers rose $582 relative to non-working single mothers. In other words, between 1984 and 1996 the increased incentive to work due to tax changes was about three times as large as that due to changes in welfare benefits. Medicaid coverage for the families of single mothers increased by about 0.26 family members over this same period. Valued at the average cost of Medicaid coverage for adults ($1,083) and children ($1,900) during this period, the changes in Medicaid eligibility increased single mothers' relative incentive to work by about $752 between 1984 and 1996. The change in average child care benefits for those with young children was smaller at about $294. Combining the changes in taxes, welfare, Medicaid and child care increased the financial return to working a total of $3,258 over the 1984-96 period. This change was almost 18 percent of the average annual pre-tax and transfer earnings of working single mothers ($18,165) . As a percentage of the financial gain from working ($7,270 in 1984) , this change was nearly a 45 percent increase. Overall, the policy changes between 1984 and 1996, especially the tax changes, dramatically increased the incentive for single mothers to work.
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DATA
The data used in this paper come from the Current Population Survey (CPS), a nationally representative monthly survey of approximately 60,000 households. We use two types of the CPS data, the March CPS Files and the merged Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) data. During each interview household members are asked whether they worked last week and if so, how many hours they worked, as well as many other questions. In the March interviews, individuals are asked to provide detailed retrospective information including hours, earnings, and weeks worked during the previous year. The ORG files come from all 12 months of the year but only include the same person once in a given year.
The March CPS data are from the 1968-97 interviews, and therefore provide information on the years 1967-96. The ORG data are from all 12 months during 1984-96. We report two different measures of employment: whether a woman worked last week, (the ORG data) and whether a woman worked at all last year (from the March CPS data). Each measure has its advantages. Whether a woman worked last week is probably a better measure of labor supply to use as an input to policy decisions since its average captures the fraction of women working in a given week. This variable will be especially useful if those who move in or out of the work force on the margin work few weeks during the year. On the other hand, the EITC unequivocally increases the probability of working at all in a given tax year, but for some could decrease weeks worked. If our goal it to provide a sharp test of theoreti- 22 Wage changes over this period may have slightly favored the employment of single women without children relative to single mothers. Hourly wages rose by 1 percent for single mothers, but increased by 6 percent for single women without children. Note, however, that the changes in the composition of single mothers working due to their increased employment may have affected these single comparisons of means. When we account for changes in the observed characteristics of single mothers and single women without children in a log wage regression, the changes over time in hourly wages are similar for the two groups of single women.
cal predictions, whether a woman worked last year is a better outcome measure. We report both measures with the expectation that the effects of many of the recent policy changes on the weekly employment measure will be smaller than those for the annual measure. Meyer and Rosenbaum, 1999a) , there were even larger percentage increases in hours worked. Prior to the 1984-96 period, there were some earlier periods when the employment rate of single mothers was high, particularly 1969-70 and 1978-80 . Neither of these earlier periods of increase were nearly as pronounced as the recent increase. The employment of single mothers appears to be cyclical as their employ- 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 ment tends to rise as the overall unemployment rate falls. However, these two variables do not track each other that closely, as the unemployment troughs of 1973 and 1989 were not associated with substantial employment rate increases for single mothers. The recent rise in the employment of single mothers appears to have little precedent in the past. However, since we have not thoroughly studied the changes in policy prior to 1984 (such as the OBRA 1981 provisions, which discouraged work by welfare recipients), we cannot be much more definitive about the employment rates in these much earlier years. Table 3 also shows that the recent increases in the employment of single mothers were mirrored by changes in welfare receipt of a similar magnitude and the opposite sign. This pattern is not sufficient, however, to conclude whether changes in work incentives, or welfare per se, led to the behavioral changes. With this in mind, it is striking that 1996 is the first year that most women who received welfare also worked during the year.
CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT AND WELFARE RECEIPT
HAS THE EMPLOYMENT OF OTHER GROUPS RISEN WITH THAT OF SINGLE MOTHERS?
To examine if these policy changes are the likely cause of recent changes in the employment of single mothers, we compare the employment trends of single mothers to those of other groups. If the increases in employment were not shared by other groups, it is more likely that policies that affected single mothers, but not others, were responsible. We use multiple comparison groups because each of the groups has strengths and weaknesses. While no single comparison provides a compelling picture, the weight of the evidence from the many different comparisons provides strong evidence of behavioral effects. In Table 4 through Table 6 , we report raw employment differences for the various treatment and comparison groups. As a check on these comparisons, we have also estimated probit equations which account for differences in the characteristics of members of the groups and changes in these characteristics over time. We also include a measure of macroeconomic conditions (the state unemployment rate) as well as its interaction with educational group and treatment group. We report the year*single mother estimates from these probit equations (1984 normalized to zero) in Figures 8 and 9 for our main comparisons, while others are described in the text.
Single Mothers vs. Single Women without Children
We begin by comparing the employment rates of single mothers and single women without children. 24 In the left panel of Table 4 , we report these employment rates during a typical week from the ORG data, and in the right panel we report the rate for work at all during the year from the March data. We report rates for single women with and without children and the difference in employment rates between single mothers and single women without children. We report this difference because many determinants of employment that change over time, in particular wages, might be expected to affect the two groups similarly. However, other determinants of employment, in particular the tax and transfer programs described earlier, specifically affect single mothers.
The employment rates reported in Table  4 show a striking time pattern. In the ORG sample, weekly employment increased by almost 6 percentage points for single mothers between 1984 and 1996, but declined by 0.75 percentage points for single women without children. In the March CPS, annual employment rose by 8.70 percentage points for single mothers, but declined by over a full percentage point for single women without children over the same time period. Furthermore, nearly all of the relative increase in employment for single mothers took place between 1991 and 1996. These results suggest that the rising employment of single mothers was not a result of better work opportunities for all women, since single women without children had slight declines in employment. Moreover, the timing of the increase in employment suggests that policy changes in the 1990s are likely to have played a role.
The changes in employment over time for single mothers compared to those without children might be partly explained by differential changes over time in characteristics such as age and education for single women with and without children. Moreover, business cycles may differentially affect single women with and without children, thereby leading to employment shifts unrelated to policy changes. However, the results are little changed when we account for a wide range of demographic and business cycle character-istics, including the unemployment rate as well as its interaction with whether or not a woman has chil- 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1996-1984 dren. 25 To illustrate this result, we show in Figures 8 and 9 the difference in employment rates between single mothers and single women without children for the years 1984-96, after accounting for these demographic and business cycle characteristics. Figure 8 reports the pattern of weekly employment from the ORG, while Figure 9 shows the pattern of annual employment from the March CPS.
Both figures show a relative increase in single mothers' employment that accelerated after 1991. As we expected, the relative increases in single mothers' employment are larger for annual employment from the March CPS than for weekly employment from the ORG data.
One concern in interpreting changes in employment for single mothers during the years 1992 to 1994, is that beginning 25 For example, between 1984 and 1996 probit average derivatives indicate that the weekly employment of single mothers relative to single women without children rises 7.1 percentage points without controls and 6.8 percentage points with controls. For annual employment, the corresponding numbers are 11.7 percentage points without controls and 11.5 percentage points with controls. The controls include state, race, ethnicity, age, education, marital status, marital status interacted with a children indicator, the number of children under six and eighteen, the state unemployment rate, the state unemployment rate interacted with education group, the state unemployment rate interacted with a children indicator, (for the March CPS only) controls for pregnancy, central city and unearned income, and (for the ORG only) controls for month and month interacted with a children indicator. See Meyer and Rosenbaum (1999a) Section 5.3 for details. 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1996-1991 1996-1984 in January 1994 the CPS used a redesigned questionnaire. In Appendix 2, we assess the extent of any bias due to the redesign using the parallel survey which, provides contemporaneous responses using the new and old surveys. We also employ ORG/March comparisons using the fact that redesign affected the two datasets at different points in time. Overall, these comparisons indicate that the CPS redesign had a small effect which, if it leads to any bias, suggests that we slightly understate the recent employment increases of single mothers. Table 5 provides a second set of comparisons: single mothers versus married mothers. This comparison is useful because there have been legislative changes other than welfare and tax policy, such as child care programs and family leave rules, that might be expected to affect mothers, but not those without children. Thus, the previous results could be partially due to the presence of such programs, instead of changes in tax and transfer programs. When examining the employment rate of married mothers, however, one needs to keep in mind that, unlike the rate for single women without children, the employment rate of married women has been rising steadily for nearly a century. The left hand side of Table 5 shows that work in a typical week rose 10.7 percentage points between 1984 and 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1996-1984 1984 1988 1992 1996 1996-1984 Again, Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the rise in single mothers' employment relative to that of married mothers, after accounting for demographic and business cycle factors. The figures indicate that the longterm trend relative decrease in single mothers employment was reversed by 1986 for annual employment and by 1991 for weekly employment. The relative employment of single mothers then rose sharply starting in 1994 or 1995. Thus, the recent rise in employment of single mothers does not appear to be due to factors which affected all mothers.
Single Mothers vs. Married Mothers
Single Mothers vs. Black Men
In the top panel of Table 6 , single mothers are compared to black men. We examine black men because relatively disadvantaged groups may respond similarly to macroeconomic conditions and other changes in the low-wage labor market. There are only small changes over time in the employment rates for black men, particularly for work at any time in the year from the March CPS. Therefore, again there are large increases in the relative employment rate of single mothers during the 1984-96 period, again especially since 1991. Probit equations that control for individual characteristics (we now interact all the controls with being a black man as well as include the main effects) do little to alter the patterns in the 1990s, though they do increase the relative rise in single mothers' employment over the full 1984-96 period. These results can be seen in Figures 8 and 9 . The weekly employment rate of black men in the ORG data is low (only about 10 percentage points higher than that of single mothers), thus the constancy of the black male employment rate is not due to a lack of room for it to rise. Overall, changes in the economic conditions affecting disadvantaged groups do not appear to be an explanation for the recent increases in the employment of single mothers.
High School Dropout Single Mothers and Single Women without Children
In the bottom panel of Table 6 , we compare high school dropout single mothers to high school dropout women without children. High school dropout single mothers are likely to be disproportionately affected by the EITC given their low wages and the recent expansions in the credit for those with the lowest earnings that we saw in Figure 2 . Furthermore, among high school dropouts the wages and other characteristics of single mothers and single women without children are more similar than those in the sample of single women with all levels of education (see Figure 10) . Finally, high school dropout single women without children have quite low employment rates, implying that they should be responsive to favorable changes in working conditions that affect all low educated single women. When we compare work in a typical week over 1984-96, the employment rate of single mothers rises 9.8 percentage points relative to that of single women without children. For employment anytime dur-ing the year, the relative rise is 14.7 percentage points. In both cases, most of the rise occurs in the 1990s. When we control for individual characteristics in a probit equation as described above (we now drop the education controls) the relative increases in single mothers' employment are about one-third larger. However, over the period since 1991, the controls have little effect, barely affecting the large rise in single mothers' employment. Overall, there are particularly large increases in the relative employment of high school dropout single mothers during the period of EITC expansions.
DO THE PATTERNS OF EMPLOYMENT CHANGE SUGGEST THAT POLICY LED TO THE CHANGES?
As we emphasized earlier, the changes in tax and welfare policy in recent years should have particularly affected certain groups. In this section, we examine some of these hypotheses in order to determine which policies were likely responsible for the increases in employment. In the top panel of Table 7 we begin by looking at the employment changes for those with two or more children relative to those with only one child. Recall from above that the EITC only differed trivially by the number of children until 1994. By 1996, however, the maximum credit for families with two or more children had risen to $3,556, while that for one child families had remained constant in real terms since 1994 and was $2,152. The effect of these EITC changes on expected taxes for women who work can be seen in Table 2 and Figure 3 . Between 1993 and 1996, income taxes when working fell an average of $1,049 for single mothers with two or more children, but by only $346 for those with one child.
We see in Table 7 that the employment of single mothers with two or more children was steady or falling through 1993, both on an absolute level and relative to single mothers with one child. Between 1984 and 1993, the employment of single mothers with two or more children minus that for those with one child fell 3.6 percentage points for work in a typical week. For work anytime during the year, the difference in employment fell 6.3 percentage points. Beginning in 1994, this trend reversed sharply with single mothers with two or more children increasing their relative employment. Between 1993 Figure 10 . The Distribution of Hourly Earnings for HS Dropout Single Women with and without Children and 1996, the relative employment in a typical week of those with two or more children rose 1.9 percentage points. For work anytime during the year, the increase was a very large 10.2 percentage points. This pattern closely fits what would be expected if the EITC had a substantial causal effect on employment. Two alternative explanations for this pattern of employment change by number of children are not supported by the evidence. It is possible that a given dollar tax cut could have different quantitative effects on one and two child families, complicating the use of family size as a source of identification. However, the pattern of tax and employment changes are fortuitous in allowing us to distinguish the effects on one child versus two or more child families. The EITC expansions through 1993 cut taxes equally for the two groups and coincided with relative decreases in the employment of single mothers of two or more children, suggesting a smaller per dollar effect on those with two or more children. After 1993, however, the expansions were focused on mothers with two or more children, and it is only then that we see relative increases in the employment of this group. Note that changes in the incremental welfare benefits for additional children are also not a plausible alternative explanation. Over the full 1984 to 1996 period, or the recent 1993 to 1996 period, the difference in welfare benefits between those with one and two or more children did not change in percentage terms, and the absolute differences in the changes were small.
To examine further whether tax policy was the cause of the employment increase, the bottom panel of Table 7 compares employment changes in low and high cost 1984 1988 1992 1993 1996 1993-1984 1996-1993 1996-1984 1984 1988 1992 1996 1996-1984 National Tax Journal Vol. 53 no. 28 Employment rates increased more in the low living cost states through most of the 1984-96 period, as predicted. However, the employment increase is not focused in the last few years of greatest expansion of the EITC, and is probably larger than is plausible. Nevertheless, the increase does begin in 1988 or 1989, which is roughly consistent (especially with a lagged response) with the longer period of increases in the EITC from 1987 through 1996. We have also examined the change in employment in high and low cost of living states for single mothers relative to those for single women without children. In this case, the changes in employment between the two sets of states are less sharp, particularly for work in a typical week, but they still go in the expected direction. Overall, the cost of living differences are further evidence in favor of a tax effect on employment, though the differences reported in the bottom of Table 7 are probably too large to be purely due to the interaction of living costs and taxes.
In the top panel of Table 8 , we continue to probe whether the evidence is consistent with a substantial effect of tax changes on employment. Here we examine the change in employment among single 1984 1988 1992 1996 1996-1984 National Tax Journal Vol. 53 no. In the bottom panel of Table 8 we examine single mothers with children under six compared to single women without children. For women with young children the increase in employment in the ORG data is even larger than it was for all single mothers: 10.1 percentage points. In the March data the increase in employment is larger still: 13.4 percentage points. As noted earlier, there are only small changes in the employment of single childless women. Since many of the policy changes might be expected to particularly affect mothers of young children, 29 this result is interesting but does not rule out or confirm any particular policy. This comparison of two groups also partly reflects the effect of having two or more children, since those with a young child are more likely to have more than one child under 18. The bottom panel of Table 9 compares states with large Medicaid expansions to those with small expansions in their Medicaid eligibility rules. The panel indicates that employment rose more over the 1984 to 1996 period in states with large Medicaid expansions than in states with small expansions. However, the timing of the employment changes is not very favorable to a causal interpretation of this finding. Medicaid coverage increased the fastest in states with large increases relative to those with small increases during 1986 to 1991 and 1993 to 1996. In the ORG, the employment of single mothers fell in states with large increases relative to those with small increases during both of these periods. In the March CPS, relative employment increased during the first period but fell during the second period.
We also examined states with major statewide welfare applications by 1994. There is a relative increase in both measures of employment for these states, but it appears that the increase in employment 29 The changes in the AFDC training programs particularly affected women with young children and the child care programs might be expected to have the largest effects on pre-school children. However, even the changes in welfare and the EITC might have the largest impact on those with young children, if this group is disproportionately located close to the work/non-work margin.
began well before the states even applied for the waivers, and application usually preceded implementation by a year or more.
To assess the relative contribution of changes in different policies in causing the recent employment increases, some form of multivariate analysis is probably the best approach. A multivariate approach, such as that used in Meyer and Rosenbaum (forthcoming), can account for the many dimensions of policy change, the differential impact of the policies on different types of families, and the timing of the specific changes. The approach taken in this paper is a complement, not an alternative, to this earlier approach.
The EITC might be expected to have a lagged effect on employment if some recipients do not learn about changes in the credit until after they file their taxes or receive a refund. There is some hint that EITC changes have a lagged effect on employment in the overall time pattern of employment changes and in the cost of living results. Eissa and Liebman (1996) and Meyer and Rosenbaum (forthcoming) found some evidence in favor of a lagged effect. In addition, the elasticities in the latter paper, which are based on a more structured analysis of the data in this paper, are not large relative to those in the literature, and thus may be consistent with imperfect perception of taxes. 1984 1986 1988 1991 1992 1993 1996 1991-1986 1996-1993 1996- In this section, we examine whether single mothers and the comparison groups are comparable in a number of dimensions. In particular, we examine the wages of the different groups, 'ceiling effects' that could lead to the differential impact of omitted factors on the groups, and the potential endogeneity of single motherhood.
The primary determinant of employment for single mothers and the comparison groups is wages. We examined the wage distributions of single mothers and the comparison groups using the March CPS data averaged over the 1984-96 period. While single women without children have higher wages on average than single mothers, there is a high degree of overlap between the two distributions. The same high degree of overlap is true for the wage distributions of single and married mothers. In Figure 10 we show the distributions for single women with and without children after one restricts the sample to those with less than a high school education. The wage distributions for these two groups are almost indistinguishable. Thus, the wage levels of single mothers and the comparison groups, especially once one conditions on education, are quite comparable. One might then ask if there have been disproportionate changes in the wages of single mothers and the comparison groups over time. We focus on single women with and without children since they are our primary comparison group. If the wages of single mothers rose more in recent years than the wages of single women without children, it would provide an alternative explanation for the rise in single mothers' employment. As mentioned earlier, the reverse is true: the wages of single childless women rose about 6 percent between 1984 and 1996, while those of single mothers only rose about 1 percent. A similar pattern holds if one looks at single women without a high school education. Overall, the pattern of wage levels and changes suggests that we are not overstating the rise in single mothers' employment.
Another potential criticism of some of our comparison groups is that their employment rates are so high that it is unreasonable to expect them to respond to changes in economic conditions and other factors in the same way that single mothers do. In our probit estimates, this argument is not compelling because we include as controls the unemployment rate as well as its interaction with being a single mother, which accounts for a differential effect of economic conditions on the two groups. This argument is also not compelling because employment rates are not particularly high for several of our comparison groups, especially for work in a typical week. Married mothers and single mothers have similar employment rates, and the weekly employment of black men is only about 10 percentage points higher than the rate for single mothers. Most importantly, in the comparison of low-educated single women with and without children, the employment rates of both groups are not high at all. Only 33 percent of high school dropout single mothers and 48 percent of high school dropout single women without children worked in a typical week. Nevertheless, the relative changes in employment are larger for high school dropouts than that for all single mothers.
Yet another potential criticism is that using variation across women in their marital status and presence of children implicitly assumes that marriage and fertility decisions are exogenous to the policy changes that we examine. The evidence on the effects of policy changes on these decisions is mixed, making the exogeneity assumption more plausible. For example, in her recent review, Hoynes (1997) concludes: "Together this evidence suggests that marriage decisions are not sensitive to financial incentives." She also argues that: "Overall [the effects of welfare on out-of-wedlock births] are often insignificant, and when they are not, they are small (pp. 129-30) ." On the other hand, another recent review, Moffitt (1997) , suggests the weight of the evidence implies some effect of welfare benefits on marriage and fertility. The last column of Table 3 reports the fraction of women 19-44 who are single mothers for the years 1967 to 1996. This rate shows a steep increase over the period as it more than triples between 1967 and 1991. In recent years, the rate of increase has slowed, suggesting that the large recent increases in work by single mothers are not due to working women changing their fertility or marriage behavior. However, the appropriate counterfactual rate of single motherhood is unclear. Aggregate data may also hide increases in marriage for some groups and decreases for others. Eissa and Hoynes (1999) conclude that recent tax and welfare changes increased marriage rates for very low-income couples, but decreased marriage among those with somewhat higher incomes. 30 However, given that we expect only small changes in marriage and fertility, it is unlikely that employment rates are sufficiently different across these groups to lead to a substantial increase in measured employment for single mothers. Overall, it is likely that endogenous single motherhood exerts a small bias on our results.
CONCLUSIONS
Between 1984 and 1996, there were enormous changes in many of the tax and transfer programs that affect single mothers. The Earned Income Tax Credit was expanded, welfare benefits were cut, welfare time limits were added and cases were terminated, Medicaid for the working poor was expanded, training programs were redirected, and programs providing subsidized or free child care were expanded. All of these changes would be expected to encourage single mothers to work.
These changes were followed by large increases in the employment rates of single mothers. The employment of single mothers in a typical week rose 6 percentage points, while employment at all during the year rose 8.5 percentage points. These employment increases were not shared by other low-wage groups, such as single women without children, married mothers, or black men. This evidence suggests that policy changes specific to single mothers are likely to be responsible for the recent rise in their employment.
We then examine which policies were the likely cause of the employment increases. There were large relative increases in the employment of single motherswith two or more children beginning in the year when there was a substantially higher EITC for those with two or more children. There were also larger increases in employment in states with a low cost of living, where a given dollar EITC would be expected to have a larger effect. We find some evidence of larger employment increases in states with their own EITCs. States with larger Medicaid expansions had larger employment increases, but the timing of the employment changes fits poorly with that of the policy changes. Furthermore, there is little evidence for an effect of changes in welfare benefits. However, welfare and Medicaid may be better evaluated in a multivariate structural approach such as that of Meyer and Rosenbaum (forthcoming) . Overall, the findings are supportive of our earlier conclusion that the EITC had a major role in spurring the recent increase in the employment of single mothers.
those from the supplemental questionnaires (the basis for the March CPS data), it is not surprising that the effects of the redesign are larger in the ORG.
The second method of estimating the redesign bias exploits the parallel survey of 12,000 households that was conducted using the new collection procedures and questionnaire between July 1992 and December 1993. Table A2 reports comparisons of the difference in differ- 33 The ORG/March CPS difference from the parallel survey may be due to differences between the parallel survey and the regular CPS. In particular, the parallel survey interviewers had lower caseloads, and the interviews were longer and were supervised more carefully. 34 A final source of evidence is the SIPP employment rate change between reported in Liebman (1998 . He finds that employment rose 4.5 percentage points over this period. The comparable change in the ORG was 1.8 percentage points, again suggesting that the ORG understates the rise in single mothers' employment.
ences (single mothers minus single women without children) in the parallel survey to those in the ORG. These estimates suggest a small but insignificant positive bias in the ORG due to the redesign. Hence, this analysis suggests that the redesign resulted in a small overstatement of the increase in employment of single mothers in the ORG. 33 Overall, these comparisons indicate that the CPS redesign is not the source of the recent employment increases of single mothers. 1993-1992 1994-1993 Effect 
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